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Abstract 
This paper develops an alternative political agency model. We add uncertainty related to the 
payoff of electing the challenger and then we model effort by the politicians as an 
investment in a public good that will be realized if and only if the incumbent is reelected. We 
find that uncertainty related to the challenger has an ambiguous effect on the level of 
investment, but that more uncertainty makes the incumbent less willing to invest when the 
politicians care about the payoff from the investment. Using this model we then proceed to 
find that there can exist a level of uncertainty where the incumbent would be willing to 
invest in a non-electoral system, but the presence of elections make the incumbent unwilling 
to invest. In this case the voter might be better off without elections. Then we find that the 
effect of electoral biases on the level of investment is depending on the level of uncertainty.  
Longer terms of office can increase the incentives to invest in the public good.  
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1.    Introduction 
The aim of every political Constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers 
men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the 
common good of society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual 
precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public 
trust.  
(Madison, 1788[1972]) 
 
In contrast to the quote above social choice theory takes a dim view of elections. Arrow’s 
famous impossibility theorem shows that it is not always possible to aggregate individual 
preferences into coherent group preferences that satisfy minimal criteria of fairness (Arrow, 
1951). The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem builds on Arrow’s theorem and shows that every 
voting system that is not manipulable has other unreasonable features (Gibbard, 1973, 
Satterthwaite, 1975). McKelvey’s chaos theorem shows that voting systems will produce 
cyclical results in multidimensional settings (McKelvey, 1976). How can we then justify the 
electoral system?  
 
One tradition argues that these results are without practical relevance (Mackie, 2003, 
Dowding, 2006). However, Riker (1982) argues that the social choice theorems imply that 
we must reject the notion of elections as a way of expressing the true preferences of the 
people. If we cannot aggregate preferences and elections are manipulable and cyclical then 
there can be no popular opinion that expresses the preferences of the people (Riker,1982). 
This contrasts Rousseau’s idea of democracy as the “general will” of the people 
(1762[1950]) and Riker thus rejects Rousseau’s populist democracy. However, Riker has an 
alternative justification for democracy, which he defines as the liberal notion of democracy 
(Riker,1982). Elections provide the people with a mechanism to keep the politicians 
accountable through the possibility of reelection. According to Riker the function of 
elections is to “throw the rascals out”, and more generally to keep a check on politicians and 
keep them accountable. This notion of democracy is not new. As the quote above suggests, 
Madison expressed much of the same ideas in the Federalist Papers (1788[1972]).  
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Translated to a modern language, the quote from Madison explains that an electoral system 
should elect more competent politicians and give the elected politicians incentives to exert 
effort. When Madison wrote the Federalist Papers there did not exist a formal framework for 
the analysis of such problems, but this has changed with the development of game theory 
and agency theory. The liberal notion of democracy is well-suited to be modeled as a 
principal-agent problem where the politician is the agent and the people is acting as a 
principal. In politics the people generally cannot promise monetary payment conditional on 
the politician acting in the interests of the people (though Besley (2004) provides a 
discussion of different payments to politicians). However, the people have the opportunity to 
reelect the politician, and can in some cases use this instrument to incentivize the politician 
to act in the interests of the people.   
 
Throughout this paper we in most cases assume that politicians and voters are rational. This 
assumption is admittedly not very realistic and it has been subject to a thorough critique 
(Wolfers,2002, Caplan,2011). In this paper we refer to politicians rather than parties as the 
political actors. In presidential elections this makes sense, but in parliamentary electoral 
systems parties get elected into office. Parties can be divided in factions (Dewan & 
Squintani, 2012), and then it can matter whether we use the party or the politician as the unit 
of analysis. However, we will assume that the politician and the party have the same 
preferences, and refer to the politicians as the only political actors. It is also assumed that the 
politician either is in position or opposition, but this is also a simplification. In Switzerland 
the distinction between position and opposition is not clear (Church & Vatter, 2009).   
 
In this paper we will develop an alternative framework to analyze political agency problems. 
In section 2 we will go through some influential theories in the field of political agency. In 
section 3 we develop an alternative model of political agency, and we expand this model 
with a biased voter (section 4), different term lengths (section 5) and uncertainty related to 
the incumbent (section 6). In section 7 we present a short review of the empirical literature in 
the field.  
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2. Theoretical literature 
 
2.1 The effect of electoral incentives 
Some of the first efforts to model political agency were made by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn 
(1986). In the literature following these papers electoral accountability has been the key 
feature.  In a basic model in this tradition, the elected politician does not want to exert effort 
in office, but can be incentivized to exert effort through a suitable reelection rule. This can 
be seen as a pure moral hazard problem, where the reelection is the mechanism that the 
principal can use to keep the agent accountable. A basic version of this problem can be 
modeled in a two-period setting with one incumbent (e.g the president or ruling party), one 
passive challenger and one representative voter. The politician gets a rent R from being in 
office, but effort is costly (e) and the future is discounted (β).  In the models in this tradition 
we do not think that politicians care about the implemented policies, so the politicians only 
care about getting reelected. In the second and last period there is no effort because there are 
no incentives through reelection possibilities. The people can then choose to reelect the 
incumbent if and only if a certain effort has been made, and the highest possible effort is 
such that the following equality holds: 
ܴ ൌ ܴ െ ҧ݁ ൅ ߚܴ 
The left hand side is the payoff from zero effort, while the right hand side shows the payoff 
of exerting effort, and the maximum effort level is such that the incumbent is indifferent. 
After the first period effort has been exerted the voter is indifferent between reelecting the 
incumbent and electing the challenger, so the voter can reelect the incumbent without acting 
irrationally. Ferejohn (1986) also expands this to an infinite-period setting. In the basic 
model above there will not be more effort in an infinite setting. We denote V as the 
continuation value of the voter, and we only look for stationary strategies: 
ܸ ൌ ܴ െ ݁ ൅ ߚܸ 
By not exerting effort the incumbent gets R, so the highest effort is given by: 
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ܴ ൌ ܴ െ ҧ݁ ൅ ߚ
ܴ െ ҧ݁
ͳ െ ߚ
 
ҧ݁ ൌ ߚܴ 
The models in this tradition in general have appealing features for the voters. The 
equilibrium strategies are sequentially rational, and the equilibrium is the one preferred by 
the voter (Ashworth, 2012).  
2.2 Incentives and selection 
The models in the previous section are pure moral hazard models where all politicians are 
similar. On the other hand, in pure adverse selection models the goal is to avoid selecting 
corrupt politician or alternatively to select the most competent politician (Besley and 
Prat,2006). In general we would like the electoral models to be able to select the best 
politicians and give the elected politicians incentives to exert effort. Fearon (1999) shows 
that the pure moral hazard models are not robust to heterogeneity in the competence of 
politicians. In the second (and last) period there will generally be no effort, such that the 
voter is indifferent between reelecting the incumbent and electing a random drawn 
challenger. Because of this indifference, the voter can just as well elect the challenger after 
the incumbent has exerted effort. Voting rules based on indifference conditions are thus 
considered fragile (Fearon,1999). If there is just a small variation in competence (and if 
voters prefer a competent politician) then the voter is no longer indifferent, and the voter will 
reelect the incumbent if and only if the incumbent is more competent than the challenger. 
The less competent incumbent will then not act in the interests of the voters in the first 
period, because no matter how much the people appreciate this effort, there will still be 
incentives to vote for a more competent politician (given that second period effort is zero). 
Similarly, an incumbent that with certainty is more competent than the challenger has no 
incentives to exert effort in the first period because the voter still prefers the incumbent in 
the second period. 
 
 Fearon (1999) then suggests that electoral models will not always incentivize effort when 
allowing for heterogeneous candidates. This potential conflict between the two effects of 
elections is incorporated in newer political agency models which we will discuss below. This 
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represents a principal-agent problem where there is both hidden action (moral hazard) and 
hidden information (adverse selection). Present political agency models focus on these two 
issues simultaneously. Elections function as a mechanism to give the elected politicians 
incentives, but also as mechanism to elect more competent politicians.  
 
2.3  Career concern models 
One response to the Fearon critique is to use the career concern models first developed by 
Holmström (1982, 1999)  in a political setting (Persson and Tabellini,2002, Ashworth,2005, 
Alesina and Tabellini, 2007) . These models assume that the voter wants to elect a competent 
politician and wants the elected politician to exert effort. Again we assume that the politician 
gets a payoff R from being in office and also that effort is costly for the politician. But in this 
model the cost of effort is a convex function. In the second (and last) period there will not be 
any effort, so the goal of the voter after the first period is to reelect the incumbent if the 
incumbent is more competent than the challenger. Neither the voter nor the incumbent 
observes the competence of the incumbent, but they observe the performance, which is the 
sum of competence, effort and luck. The luck is assumed to be drawn from a normal 
distribution with mean 0, and the competence is normally distributed with a mean m: 
ߨ௧ ൌ ߠ௝ ൅ ݁௧ ൅ ߝ௧ 
The voter observes π, but does not know if a large π is due to much effort, a competent 
politician or luck. However, for a certain anticipated level of effort (݁ଵ௔ሻ the voter can use 
Bayesian updating to find the probability that the incumbent is more competent than 
challenger. Because uncertainty and competence both are normally distributed we can solve 
the problem analytically. Then these models define ߣ ൌ ఙഇమ
ఙഇ
మାఙഄమ
 and Bayesian updating 
shows that the posterior expectation about the competence level of the incumbent is given by 
the following expression: 
ߣሺߨଵ െ ݁ଵ
௔ሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߣሻ݉ 
The voter knows that the challenger’s competence is drawn from a normal distribution with 
mean m, so the voter reelects the incumbent whenever the following inequality holds: 
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ߣሺߨଵ െ ݁ଵ
௔ሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߣሻ݉ ൒ ݉ 
This weighted average of the performance and the prior depends more on the prior when the 
random uncertainty is very large, because performance then becomes a less precise signal of 
competence. The above expression can be simplified to the following inequality: 
ߨଵ ൒ ݉ ൅ ݁ଵ
௔ 
Elections become a selection mechanism, because incumbents with more competence are 
more likely to get reelected. The incumbent knows that there will only be reelection 
whenever the first period performance is large enough. But the incumbent does not know his 
own competence or the realized value of the luck. This means that the incumbent must 
estimate the probability of getting reelected for different levels of effort, and find the optimal 
effort. The incumbent thus maximizes this expression: 
ܴ כ ܲሺ ߨଵ ൒ ݉ ൅ ݁ଵ
௔ פ ݁ ሻ െ ܿሺ݁ሻ 
Again the model takes advantage of the fact that both competence and luck is normally 
distributed to rewrite this expression and find the probability of reelection.  
ߠ௝ ൅ ߝ௧̱ܰሺ݉ǡ ߪఏ
ଶ ൅ ߪఌ
ଶሻ 
ܴ כ ܲ൫ ߠ௝ ൅ ߝଵ ൒ ݉ ൅ ݁ଵ
௔ െ ݁ פפ ݁ ൯ െ ܿሺ݁ሻ 
ܴ ቈͳ െ ߶ሺ
݁ଵ
௔ െ ݁
ඥߪఏଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ
ሻ቉ െ ܿሺ݁ሻ 
Taking the first order conditions of this expression provides the optimal level of effort: 
ܴ
ඥߪఏଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ
כ ߮ ቆ
݁ଵ
௔ െ ݁כ
ඥߪఏଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ
ቇ ൌ ܿԢሺ݁כሻ 
This model assumes that the rational voter correctly anticipates the level of effort. Otherwise 
the voter could have done better by adjusting expectation. This means that the first-order 
conditions above can be simplified to the following expression: 
ܴ
ඥʹߨሺߪఏଶ ൅ ߪఌଶሻ
ൌ ܿԢሺ݁כሻ 
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This is the basic result describing the equilibrium level of effort (Alesina and Tabellini, 
2007). This expression implicitly provides the equilibrium level of effort. Then the models 
shows that when the uncertainty about the competence of the incumbent increases, the level 
of effort decreases.  In this case effort will less likely determine whether the politician gets 
reelected. The same logic applies for the random luck. More randomness decreases the 
probability that effort will be affecting the reelection process, and because effort is costly 
this leads to less effort. The voter anticipates the correct level of effort, so the probability for 
the incumbent to get reelected is actually the same as the probability of reelection if zero 
effort was the equilibrium.  
 
The career concern models are able to combine effort and competence into a single 
framework. This highlights the notion that the function of elections is to select competent 
politicians and give them incentives to act in the interests of the people. However, the model 
has made restrictive assumptions about the distribution of competence and random luck. If 
one of these random variables belonged to another distribution than the normal distribution, 
then Bayesian updating could have been more analytically difficult. More problematically, 
the model assumes that voters are capable of doing these calculations. The model also 
simplifies the electoral settings by discarding policy preferences. It can be argued that it is 
not always reasonable that the incumbent does not get any private signals about his own 
competence.  Sometimes we would expect that the incumbent knows more about his own 
competence than the voter. In the career concern models we so far assumed that the voter 
was unbiased, meaning that the voter reelected the incumbent if the posterior probability of 
the competence of the incumbent is higher than the anticipated competence of the challenger.  
 
 An advantage of the career concern models is the flexibility. We can extend the payoff 
function when reelecting the incumbent with a small incumbency advantage term k, which 
means that reelecting the incumbent gives the voter an additional payoff. The conditions for 
reelecting the incumbent can then be written like this: 
ߣሺߨଵ െ ݁ଵ
௔ሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߣሻ݉ ൅ ݇ ൒ ݉ 
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Using the same derivation as above we rewrite the payoff function and then find the first 
order conditions, again using that the voter is not fooled in equilibrium: 
ܴ כ ܲ ቀߠ௝ ൅ ߝଵ ൒ ݉ ൅ ݁ଵ
௔ െ ݁ െ
݇
ߣ פפ
פ ݁ ቁ െ ܿሺ݁ሻ 
ܴ
ඥߪఏଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ
כ ߮ ቌ
െ
݇
ߣ
ඥߪఏଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ
ቍ ൌ ܿԢሺ݁כሻ 
The standard normal distribution takes on a maximum value for ߮ሺͲሻ, so as long as the cost 
of effort is convex we can observe that incumbency advantage leads to less effort. This also 
holds for any bias towards electing the challenger. The intuition is that when the voter is 
biased the effect of effort on the probability of reelection decreases. If the voter is 
sufficiently biased in favor of the incumbent, the incumbent knows that just a small level of 
effort will be enough to be reelected with a large probability. 
 
2.4 Besley’s political agency model 
Besley (2006) uses a different framework for political agency modeling. In the baseline 
model there are two time periods where an elected politician makes a binary decision ݁ ג
ሼͲǡͳሽ. One voter wants the decision of the politician to match the state of the world (ݏ ג
ሼͲǡͳሽ). The voter gets a payoff of Δ if the action matches the state and zero otherwise. The 
incumbent knows the state of the world, and his type can be either congruent or dissonant 
(ܲሺݐ ൌ ܿ݋݊݃ݎݑ݁݊ݐሻ ൌ ߨ). The congruent incumbent has the same preferences as the voter 
while the dissonant incumbent gets a private benefit from choosing the opposite policy. The 
voter has the choice between reelecting the incumbent or electing a challenger that is 
congruent with the same probability. All politicians get a benefit E from staying in office.  
However, the dissonant also gets a benefit ݎ ג ሾͲǡ ܴሿ from choosing the opposite action, 
where r is drawn each period from a distribution with CDF ܩሺݎሻ and mean μ. The 
incumbents down weights the future with a discount factor of β. In the second period both 
types take their favorite action because there are no electoral incentives to make them do 
otherwise (Besley, 2006). The voter observes the payoff after the first period, so the 
congruent politician has no incentives to choose anything other than his favorite policy in the 
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first period ( ݁ଵ ൌ ݏଵ). However, the dissonant politician faces a dilemma. Choosing his 
favorite policy is best in this period, but if he rather pretends to be congruent there is a 
possibility of reelection.  The optimal action of the dissonant then depends on the realized 
value of ݎଵ, and the dissonant chooses to act congruently if and only if ݎଵ ൑ ߚሺߤ ൅ ܧሻ. The 
right hand side is the payoff the dissonant incumbent can expect by acting congruently while 
the left hand side is the payoff of acting against the interests of the voter and not get 
reelected. The probability that the dissonant voter acts in the interests of the voter is then 
given by ߣ ൌ ܩሾߚሺߤ ൅ ܧሻሿ. Bayes’ rule then provides the voters with the following 
posterior probability of the incumbent being congruent after observing an incumbent acting 
congruently: 
ܲሺܿ݋݊݃ݎݑ݁݊ݐȁܽܿݐ݅݊݃ܿ݋݊݃ݎݑ݁݊ݐ݈ݕ݅݊݌݁ݎ݅݋݀ͳሻ ൌ ߎ ൌ
ߨ
ߨ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߨሻߣ
 
The posterior probability depends on the action of the dissonant incumbent, but it will never 
be smaller than the prior, which makes acting as a congruent incumbent a good signal to 
send the voters. If the rent from being dissonant is sufficiently low there exists an 
equilibrium where the dissonant incumbent acts congruently in the first period to get 
reelected (Besley,2006). In equilibrium both types choose ݁ଵ ൌ ݏଵ and get reelected. In the 
second period the dissonant choose݁ଶ ൌ ͳ െ ݏଶ. So when the rent from being dissonant is 
low enough elections will incentivize more effort, but not select more competent politicians. 
Contrary, when the rent from being dissonant is higher elections will select better politicians, 
but not make politicians exert more effort.  
 
We can observe that there is a trade-off between the effect of incentives and selection. If the 
dissonant incumbent chooses not to act congruently, the probability that the second-term 
incumbent is competent is given by ߨ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߨሻߨ which obviously is larger than ߨ. 
However, the voter prefers incentivizing effort because this with certainty increases the 
payoff in the first period.  
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2.5  The Maskin and Tirole political agency model 
Maskin and Tirole (2005) use much of the above framework including two time periods and 
an incumbent that can be congruent or non-congruent (which is the same as dissonant in the 
Besley model). The incumbent in this model also has a binary choice of action ݔ ג ሼܽǡ ܾሽ 
with a corresponding binary state of the world, and the incumbent is still congruent with a 
probability π (with π≥1/2). It is assumed that there is one representative voter that wants to 
match the action with the state of the world, and gets a payoff of 1 if there is a match and 0 
otherwise. But in this model the voter does not have the opportunity to observe whether the 
action chosen by the incumbent is correct before the election. The voter knows that ܲሺݔ ൌ
ܽሻ ൌ ݌, where p≥1/2, and can choose to  reelect the incumbent or elect a challenger that is 
assumed to be congruent with the same probability. Maskin and Tirole (2005) investigate 
how different levels of policy and office motivation affect the chosen policies. The 
incumbent gets a rent of R by being in office and an additional rent of G by choosing the 
favorite policy. The degree of office motivation is denoted by δ, which is given by the 
following expression: 
ߜ ൌ ߚ
ܩ ൅ ܴ
ܩ
 
We can see that when the discount factor (β) is very low, which means that the incumbent 
cares little about the future, there is weak office motivation. On the other hand, if the rent 
from being in office is very large it follows that the incumbent has as strong office 
motivation. With a strong office motivation the incumbent is willing to take a non-preferred 
action in the first period if it increases the probability of reelection.  
 
When there is a strong office motivation (δ≥1) both types want to take the action that 
provides them with the largest probability of reelection.  But because both types want to stay 
in office it is not possible for the congruent type to signal the congruence to the voter.  
Taking the action ܽis however a good signal as the voter thinks ܽis the best action. So both 
types choose action ܽ and get reelected. After observing the action ܽ the voter reelects the 
incumbent even though she is indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger. There is 
another equilibrium where both types choose the unpopular action, but this is considered as a 
less natural equilibrium (Maskin and Tirole,2005). In the second period the incumbent 
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chooses his favorite policy. So the expected welfare for the voter is given by the following 
expression: 
ܹ ൌ ݌ ൅ ߨ 
The second term is the second period payoff where the incumbent is congruent with a 
probability π. The first term is given by the probability that the likely action chosen by both 
candidates is the correct action. Maskin and Tirole call this a full-pandering equilibrium, 
because the incumbent does what the voter thinks is correct. In this case there are no effects 
of selection. The incumbent in place in the second term is as likely to be congruent at the 
incumbent at the start of the first period. However, there exists an effect of incentives. With 
a probability of larger than ½ the non-congruent incumbent acts in the interests of the voters 
in the first period. But we can observe that this effect of incentives can also be negative, 
because the congruent incumbent acts against both personal interests and the voter’s interests 
to get reelected when ݔ ൌ ܾ. 
 
When there is weak office motivation (δ≤1) both types choose their preferred policy in the 
first period. This means that the non-congruent incumbent always chooses the action that the 
voter does not prefer.  But she does not know the type of the incumbent from the action.  The 
action a is still a good signal, because this action is chosen by the congruent incumbent in the 
most likely state. So the voter reelects after a and elects the challenger after action b. The 
expected payoff for the voter is given by the following expression: 
ܹ ൌ ߨሺͳ ൅ ݌ ൅ ሺͳ െ ݌ሻߨሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߨሻሺ݌ߨሻ 
The incumbent is congruent with probability π and then reelected with probability p, but 
when the congruent incumbent is not reelected there is also a possibility that the challenger 
is congruent. We can observe that elections in this case have a positive selection effect. The 
probability that the incumbent will be congruent in the second period is given by ߨሺ݌ ൅
ሺͳ െ ݌ሻߨሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߨሻ݌ߨ which is larger than ߨ.  But in this the case electoral incentives are 
not strong enough for the non-congruent incumbent to act in the interest of the voters.  So 
this model argues similarly to Fearon (1999) that there can be a conflict between 
incentivizing incumbents and selecting the best incumbents. The pandering equilibrium in 
Maskin and Tirole model implies reelecting the incumbent even though the voter in fact is 
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indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger. According to Fearon such indifference 
conditions are fragile.   
 
We can note that while incentivizing the non-congruent type is always beneficial for the 
voter in the Besley model, this does not necessarily hold in the Maskin and Tirole model. In 
the Besley model the voter observes the payoff before the election, which means that the 
non-congruent incumbent can do less harm, because the voter will not be fooled into 
reelecting after a non-congruent action. In the Maskin and Tirole model the voter has less 
information about the actions.  
 
2.6 Misaligned incentives 
In the Maskin and Tirole model we have seen that there is a pandering equilibrium where the 
incumbent chooses according to the prior of the voter. The reelection incentives can be so 
strong that even the congruent incumbent acts against the interests of the voters to get 
reelected. This means that electoral incentives can have negative welfare consequences.  
 
Canes-Wrone et al (2001) give an important contribution to the pandering literature. In their 
model the politician wants to act in the interest of the voter and stay in office, and only get a 
positive payoff if both of these conditions are satisfied. The incumbent wants to match the 
action with the state of the world, but a non-competent incumbent only gets an imprecise 
signal about the true state. The voter does not know the state of the world, but learns it with a 
certain probability. The voter can also be biased in favor of the incumbent or the challenger. 
A priori she thinks that one of the states is more likely. Canes-Wrone et al (2001) show that 
if the probability that the voter learns the state is sufficiently low and the bias is low, then the 
non-competent incumbent sometimes chooses the more likely action even though he gets the 
opposite signal. This result has an intuitive interpretation. If the voter is biased in favor of 
the challenger the incumbent will only have a chance of getting reelected if the voter is 
informed about the state, and hence there are no incentives to pander. Similarly, if the voter 
most likely learns the state, then the incumbent is not willing to play against his signal. 
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Daley and Snowberg (2009) have developed a model where the incumbent must allocate 
their time between working on campaign and public policy. In this model campaigning work 
is a cheaper way of signaling competence, which means that incumbents will spend time on 
campaigning even though the voters prefer otherwise. The voters are not fooled, but they are 
forward-looking and campaigning is an effective signal of competence, which implies too 
much campaigning. In this case the electoral accountability is the reason that the incumbent 
chooses to act against the interests of the voters. This is an example of “multi-task models” 
inspired by Holmström and Milgrom (1991).  
 
Lohmann (1998), Ashworth (2005) and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) have also 
developed multi-task models. In these models inefficiencies arise even if the incumbents 
have the same preferences as the voters. Without elections the incumbent would have chosen 
the best policy for the voter. But the incumbent in addition has incentives to take the action 
that increases the voters’ posterior about the competence of the incumbent, because this 
increases the probability of reelection. In contrast, the inefficiencies in the pandering models 
arise because of ex-ante uncertainty about which policy that is best for the voters. 
 
2.7 Political myopia 
Politicial myopia arises when politicians are biased towards short-term politics. Politicians 
may borrow too much if they think they are losing the election to make it more difficult for 
the next leaders (Persson and Svensson,1989, Alesina and Tabellini,1990). There can also be 
a short-term bias due to the fact that politicians have more incentives do what the voters 
want before an election (Nordhaus,1975). Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2013) developed a model 
where the incumbent invests too little in long-term projects because short-term effort 
improves current performance. The incumbent wants to get reelected and short-term effort 
sends a stronger signal of competence. A rational voter anticipates this, which means that the 
short-term bias does not increase the probability of reelection, but still leads to 
underinvestment. In this model the incumbent has more incentives to long-term investment 
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when there is a lot of uncertainty related to performance.  This makes short-term effort a less 
precise signal of competence, and thus gives the incumbent more incentives to make a long-
term investment.(Bonfiglioli and Gancia, 2013).  Aidt and Dutta (2011) show that political 
myopia is not an inevitable consequence of long-term investments, but that it can be a 
problem given interactions between observation lags, growth and constraints on revenue. 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) built a model where taxation on capital is used to invest in 
public good. Uncertainty about the electoral outcome reduces the level of investment 
because the incumbent is less certain to be in power after the election. 
 
2.8 The impact of the term length 
Institutional features will impact the predictions from the political agency models. Persson 
and Tabelinni (2002) investigate how different electoral systems impact the incentives of the 
incumbents. There exists a large literature on the effects of term limits (Smart and Sturm, 
2013, Besley and Case,1993), but  the effects of the duration of the time in office does not 
span an equally large literature. In the Maskin and Tirole model (2005) the term length does 
not matter as long as voters are risk neutral. When voters are risk-averse shorter terms are 
more desirable. In a two-period setting it is more risky to have one incumbent for a long term 
than to draw two random incumbent for one period each. Optimal term length is found by 
balancing this advantage with the transaction costs related to switching leaders. In the 
classical accountability papers it can be shown that in general shorter term length is better 
for the voter (Dal Bo and Rossi,2008). In these models shorter terms make the incumbents 
exert more effort and extract lower rent. Schultz (2008) has developed a model where shorter 
term leads to more accountability, but also more distortions because the incumbent wants to 
manipulate the swing-voters before the election. Dal Bo and Rossi (2011) have developed a 
model where longer terms are better if the payback of legislative effort lies in the future. 
 
2.9 Unreasonable assumptions of political agency models 
The political agency models in this tradition present a highly simplified picture of elections. 
In this tradition the voters agree that some candidates are more competent than others, and 
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everyone wants to reelect these competent politicians. The voters also agree that there is 
such a thing as exerting effort in office, and the people agree on which political behavior that 
can be labeled as effort. In reality people have different views on competence and effort. An 
even larger problem is that we know that people have policy preferences. For example, if 
Norwegian farmers and workers vote for respectively the agrarian Centre Party and the 
Labour Party, an intuitive explanation can be related to the different groups having different 
preferences. It is artificial to assume that people vote only to incentivize effort and elect 
more competent politicians. Theoretically speaking there are many reasons and explanations 
for voting behavior (Erikson, 1981, Blais & Young, 1999, Banzhaf & Walsh, 2008). 
Berganza (2000) presents three different functions of elections. One function is to discipline 
elected politicians and another function is to elect more competent politicians. A third 
function of elections is to aggregate conflicting interests (Berganza, 2000). This perspective 
of elections is at the core of a central branch of political economy (Downs, 1957, Meltzer & 
Richard,1981), where restricting the domain of preferences can allow for coherent 
aggregation of preferences (Black,1948). Political agency models generally discard elections 
as a method of aggregating non-aligned preferences. Elections function only as a mechanism 
for selection and incentives, and thus agency models clearly lose some of their power.  
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3. An alternative model of political agency 
3.1 Introduction 
When a politician is elected it is usually around 4-5 years until the next election. In some 
cases the identity of the opponents in the next election is visible from the start of the period, 
but more often there is some uncertainty related to the challenger. In U.S. presidential 
elections the identity of the challenger is rarely known with certainty until a year before the 
election. This means that the incumbent must choose actions without knowing the strength 
of the challenger. In the Besley model (2006) and the Maskin and Tirole model (2005) this 
does not pose a problem. In these models the challenger is assumed to be drawn from the 
same distribution as the incumbent, and this distribution (congruent/non-congruent) is 
everything that the voter knows about the incumbent. The incumbent has actions that will 
guarantee that their posterior probability of being congruent is at least as high as the prior, 
and by acting this way they can guarantee reelection. But this is problematic for two reasons. 
When no information is revealed the voter is indifferent, which can be considered as a fragile 
equilibrium according to Fearon (1999). Secondly, it is intuitively unlikely that ex ante there 
is an action that will guarantee reelection. In reality it is probably more likely that the 
challenger sometimes win the next election regardless of the office-motivation of the 
incumbent.  We will model this by allowing the payoff of electing the challenger to vary, and 
let the voter know the realized value of this payoff before the election. In this way the voter 
has an informational advantage over the incumbent. This approach introduces selection 
effects into the model even when all incumbents are of the same type. 
 
Contrary to the Besley (2006) and Maskin and Tirole (2005) papers we do not allow for 
politicians to deliberately desire the opposite policy of the people. Intuitively it feels more 
appropriate to let the non-congruent politicians not care about the payoff of the voter rather 
than having the opposite preferences. Of course these models use the non-congruent 
approach as a way of simplifying complex political decisions to a binary choice. In the 
Besley model the rent from acting non-congruently can be varied to change the level of non-
congruency, but the Maskin and Tirole model assumes symmetry between the congruent and 
non-congruent incumbent. This means that the payoff for the non-congruent from doing the 
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opposite action is the same payoff as the congruent gets from acting in the interests of the 
voter. We will thus not use the concept of congruent and non-congruent politicians in this 
paper. 
 
We will also think of the effort of the politicians as an investment in a public good, which 
means that there is a time-delay between the action of the incumbent and the realization of 
the payoff.  We do this to capture the idea that some political projects take time to finish, and 
this also allows us to find the effects of political myopia and different term lengths. We 
assume that all voters have the same preferences about this investment, such that we can use 
one representative voter in the model.  By thinking of the effort as an investment in a public 
good the concept of all voters having the same preferences becomes less artificial. Still it is 
clearly not the case that all voters benefit equally from public goods. 
 
3.2 The model 
3.2.1 Set-up 
In accordance with much of the literature in this field, we choose to analyze the electoral 
agency problem as a three-player problem in a two-period setting. There is one incumbent 
who was elected before the game started, one politician in the opposition (the challenger) 
and one representative voter. The incumbent has a certain amount of time or money (T) 
which can be delegated to a long term investment (I) or personal spending (S). The personal 
spending can be interpreted as corruption, but if we think of T as a time constraint then S 
also includes working hours spent on personal enhancing issues and career-promoting 
activities. The investment can be interpreted as investing in a public good that benefits all of 
the voters in the society. The return on this investment is given by ݎ. We assume that the 
incumbent cares about spending, but that the incumbent also prefers a high level of 
investment. An explanation for this can be that investment is beneficial for the voter and that 
the incumbent partially cares about the interests of the voter. The challenger has a passive 
role in this game.  The voter has to choose between reelecting the incumbent and electing the 
challenger. The payoff of electing the challenger is not known at the beginning of the game, 
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but it is distributed according to a common known uniform distribution.  This random shock 
is realized after the incumbent makes the investment decision and before the voter decides 
on reelection. The voter can also be biased in favor of the challenger (σ≥0). This bias means 
that if the incumbent provides the voter with a payoff of zero, she will most likely elect the 
challenger. Unless otherwise is explicitly formulated we assume that the bias is equal to 
zero. If the voter reelects the incumbent the payoff of the investment is realized, but if she 
elects the challenger the investment will not be finished and gives no payoff.  We assume 
that the incumbent discounts the future. We also restrict every variable and parameter to be 
non-negative. We can then show the payoff functions for the voter and the politician with 
these expressions:  
ܷ௩ሺܫሻ ൌ ݎܫଵሼͳ௜௡௖ሽ ൅ ሼሺߟሻͳ௖௛௔ሽ 
ܷ௣ሺܵǡ ܫሻ ൌ ܵଵ ൅ ሼߚሺܵଶ ൅ ߙݎܫଵሻሽ௜௙௥௘௘௟௘௖௧௘ௗ 
௧ܶ ൌ ܫ௧ ൅ ܵ௧ 
ߟ̱ܷ ൤െ
ͳ
ʹ߰
൅ ߪǡ
ͳ
ʹ߰
൅ ߪ൨ 
Obviously these are simplifying assumptions. By focusing only on two periods we make the 
game easier to solve, but also less realistic. Similarly there are in reality much more than one 
voter, but it is not easy to make a model with a realistic number of voters. The strategies 
depend on the actions of the other players, so with for example one million voters we would 
get a strategy space so large that a solution would be difficult to obtain. To assume that the 
incumbent either uses the resources on investment or personal spending is also a simplifying 
assumption. The point of this model is more to represent some mechanisms that are present 
in real-life elections than to give a complete picture of the electoral process 
.  
3.2.2 Timing of the game 
We will assume that the game is played according to the following time process. The central 
elements are that the voter has an informational advantage over the incumbent, and that the 
payoff from the investment is only realized if the incumbent is reelected.  
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1) The incumbent chooses the level of investment in period 1. 
2) The payoff of electing the challenger is realized. 
3) The voter chooses between the incumbent and the challenger.  
4) The investment from period 1 is realized if the incumbent is reelected, and the elected 
politician chooses investment in period 2. 
5) The game ends and payoffs are realized. 
 
3.2.3 Second period investment 
In the second period the incumbent chooses whether to invest if the incumbent is still in 
office. But as this game only has two periods and the payoffs of the investment is not 
realized until the next period, there are no incentives for investment in the second period.  
The voter is rational, so we know that the voter correctly assumes zero investment in the 
second period when making the electoral decision.  
ܵଶ ൌ ܶܽ݊݀ܫଶ ൌ Ͳ 
 
3.3 The case where the incumbent does not care about the voter 
We will analyze the model in two different settings.  First we will assume that the incumbent 
does not care about the investment and the resulting payoff to the voter, but only wants to 
maximize personal spending. In the second setting we will assume that the incumbent cares 
about the investment. For each of these two settings we will compare the expected payoff of 
the voter in a system with electoral accountability with the corresponding expected payoff 
without such accountability. A lack of accountability can be the case in an autocratic system, 
but for us the lack of accountability in period 1 can occur due to long terms in office.  In this 
case the incumbent is accountable, but at a later stage.  
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First we can go through the case where the politician does not care about the investment and 
the voter ሺߙ ൌ Ͳሻ.  The electoral accountability can still encourage investment because a 
high level of investment increases the probability of reelection, which in turn leads to more 
personal spending in the next period.  
3.3.1 Without electoral accountability 
We will first investigate the case where there is no electoral accountability, which means that 
there is no election for the incumbent to care about in the game. In this setting no elections 
implies zero investment: 
ܵଵ ൌ ܶܫଵ ൌ Ͳ 
ܧܷ௩ ൌ Ͳ 
The incumbent in this case does not care about the investment or the voter and has no 
incentives to invest in a system without accountability.   
 
3.3.2 Electoral accountability and the optimal reelection rule 
In general binding agreements are difficult to achieve in electoral situations. After the first 
period is over the voter is not obliged to reelect the incumbent even though the incumbent 
has acted in the interests of the voter. In the classic pure moral hazard models discussed 
above there was no uncertain payoff related to the challenger, which implied that the voter 
did not lose anything by reelecting the incumbent. But our model also differs due to the fact 
that the payoff of the investment is not realized until the next period. This effect works in the 
opposite direction as the investment gives voters incentives to reelect the incumbent. First 
we will investigate the case where the voter can credibly commit to a reelection rule, while 
we later will discuss the more realistic case of no credibility.  
 
The voter would prefer the incumbent to invest the entire budget, but knowing that the 
incumbent discounts the future this solution will not be possible. A solution for the voter will 
then be to set the reelection rule to make the incumbent accept the deal.  The incumbent is 
indifferent between accepting or not when the following equality holds: 
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ܶ െ ܫଵഥ ൅ ߚܶ ൌ ܶ 
We get this investment level and expected payoff: 
ܫଵഥ ൌ ߚܶܽ݊݀ܵଵഥ ൌ ܶሺͳ െ ߚሻ 
ܧܷ௩ ൌ ݎߚܶ 
This corresponds to the models in the tradition of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986). 
However this is not necessarily the optimal reelection rule in our setting. When committing 
to reelection there will be investment, but at the same time the voter never gets the payoff 
from the challenger, even in the cases where the random variable η is realized as a very high 
value. The voter then gets the incentives effect of elections, but will not get the effect of 
selection. The payoff of electing the challenger can be positive or negative while the payoff 
from a non-investing incumbent is zero. This means that the voter can choose between zero 
and a positive payoff even though investment is zero. As uncertainty increases this weighted 
average of zero and a positive payoff also increases.  The payoff without investment is given 
by: 
ܧܷ௩ ൌ ܲሺͲ ൒ ߟሻ כ Ͳ ൅ ൫ͳ െ ܲሺͲ ൒ ߟሻ൯ כ ܧሾߟȁߟ ൒ Ͳሿ ൌ
ͳ
ͺ߰
 
When ψ is small this ex ante expected payoff is higher than the payoff with investment 
because of this selection effect. The threshold for ψ is given by: 
߰ ൑ ෨߰ ൌ
ͳ
ͺݎߚܶ
 
For a small ψ the voter prefers this situation, but another, and potentially better, solution 
would be to encourage investment without committing to reelection. Using this strategy the 
voter can get both the effect from selection and the effect of incentives. We can (for now) 
assume that the voter only reelects the incumbent if investment is above a certain threshold, 
and that she is not obliged to reelect even though the threshold is reached. In this case the 
expected payoff is given by the following expression: 
ܧܷ௩ ൌ ܲሺݎܫሚ ൒ ߟሻ כ ݎܫሚ ൅ ቀͳ െ ܲሺݎܫሚ ൒ ߟሻቁ כ ܧሾߟȁߟ ൒ ݎܫሚሿ 
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In this case we assume that the voter can choose not to reelect the incumbent even though 
the payoff of electing the incumbent is higher. The incumbent knows that to be reelected a 
certain level of investment is necessary, although investment is not a sufficient condition for 
reelection. The voter must set the threshold such that the incumbent prefers investing 
knowing that there will be no reelection if the challenger is strong. 
 
The voter now reelects the incumbent if the expected payoff from the investment exceeds the 
payoff from electing the challenger. The incumbent does not know the payoff from the 
challenger, but the incumbent can find the probability for reelection given an investment.  
ܲሺ݅݊ܿݑܾ݉݁݊ݐ݃݁ݐݏݎ݈݁݁݁ܿݐ݁݀ሻ ൌ ܲሺݎܫଵ ൒ ߟሻ 
ܲሺߟ ൑ ݎܫଵሻ ൌ ݉݅݊ ൤
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ሺݎܫଵሻǡ ͳ൨ 
A probability cannot be negative, and this expression cannot be negative as investment 
cannot be negative. As expected we see that the probability of reelection increases with the 
amount of investment and return on the investment. We also see that when the uncertainty 
about the challenger increases (small ψ) the probability of reelection depends less on the 
amount of investment. The investment threshold is given where the following inequality 
holds with equality: 
ܶ െ ܫ ൅ ߚܶ ൤
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܫ൨ ൒ ܶ 
ܫሚ ൌ
ߚܶ
ʹ െ ʹ߰ߚݎܶ
 
We are here assuming an interior probability solution(ଵ
ଶ
൅ ߰ݎܫሚ ൏ ͳሻ, and then we get the 
following expected payoff: 
ܧܷ௩ ൌ ቀ
ଵ
ଶ
൅ ߰ݎܫሚቁ ሺݎܫሚሻ ൅ ቀ
ଵ
ଶ
െ ߰ݎܫሚቁ ቀ
ଵ
ସట
൅
௥ூሚ
ଶ
ቁ ൌ
௥ூሚ
ଶ
൅
ଵ
଼ట
൅
ଵ
ଶ
߰ሺݎܫሚሻଶ  
But how can this be a credible commitment? After all, the incumbent knows that there is a 
possibility that the payoff of electing the challenger is negative. So by deviating and setting 
investment equal to zero the voter prefers the incumbent with a probability of one half. How 
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can the voter credibly commit not to reelect the incumbent in this case? Given the nature of 
the electoral systems in democratic countries it is unlikely that such a commitment can be 
made. In a similar way she cannot credibly commit to reelect the incumbent if a certain level 
of investment is made. After the investment decision is made the voter will always have 
incentives to vote for the challenger if the payoff of the challenger is larger. We will mostly 
focus on situations where binding electoral agreements cannot be made.   
 
3.3.3 Electoral accountability without commitment 
In the more realistic case of no commitment the voter will reelect the incumbent if and only 
if the return from the investment is larger than the payoff from electing the challenger. The 
maximization problem for the incumbent in the first period is given by the following 
expression assuming an interior probability solution: 
 ܵଵ ൅ ሺ
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ሺݎሺܶ െ ܵଵሻሻሻߚሺܵଶሻ 
This reflects the fact that incumbent wants to stay in office, but at the same time does not 
want to waste resources on investment if the challenger is strong. We know that the optimal 
second period choice isܵଶ ൌ ܶ. If there is much uncertainty the probability that investment 
leads to reelection decreases, which in turn reduces the incentives to invest. If ψ is smaller 
than the following threshold there will be no investment: 
߰ ൑ ෨߰ ൌ
ͳ
ߚݎܶ
 
When the level of uncertainty is low it is better for the incumbent to invest a certain amount 
such that reelection is guaranteed. But when the level of uncertainty is high the incumbent 
has to invest more to secure reelection, and then it is better not to invest and still get 
reelected with a probability of one half. 
߰ ൑ ෨߰ǣܵଵ ൌ ܶܫଵ ൌ Ͳ 
߰ ൒ ෨߰ǣܵଵ ൌ ܶ െ
ͳ
ʹ߰ݎ
ܫଵ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ߰ݎ
 
The expected payoffs for the cases are given by the following expressions: 
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߰ ൑ ෨߰ǣܧܷ௩ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
כ Ͳ ൅
ͳ
ʹ
כ ܧሾߟȁߟ ൒ Ͳሿ ൌ
ͳ
ͺ߰
 
                                                         ߰ ൒ ෨߰ǣܧܷ௩ ൌ ଵଶట 
We can see that the voter prefers investment, which is the incentives effect of the election. 
Intuitively this also makes sense because the incumbent sets investment to guarantee 
reelection, which means that the investment level is such that the voter gets a payoff as large 
as the maximum level from the challenger. But on the other hand the incumbent only 
chooses to invest when uncertainty is low. The expected payoff of the voter can be higher 
when there is much uncertainty because this is a situation where the selection effect is 
stronger. 
 
3.3.4 Comparison with and without accountability 
Without accountability the incumbent is not willing to invest and the voter gets a payoff of 
zero.  In a system with electoral accountability the voter gets a positive payoff. When the 
uncertainty is low there is an incentives effect that makes the incumbent invest. For higher 
level of uncertainty the incumbent is unwilling to invest, but electoral accountability is still 
beneficial for the voter because of the selection effect. The voter has the opportunity to select 
the challenger only when she prefers the challenger, so we have the following result: 
Proposition 3.3 If the incumbent does not care about the voter then the voter always prefers 
to have elections. 
 
3.3.5 The effect of uncertainty on the selection and incentives 
Uncertainty has a mixed effect on the expected payoff of the voter. A very large uncertainty 
can be beneficial for the voter even though there is no investment. This selection effect is 
increasing in uncertainty because the voter always has the safe option of reelecting a non-
investing incumbent.  For lower values of uncertainty (߰ ൒ ෨߰) the incumbent always get 
reelected, such that there are no selection effects. However, in this case there is an incentive 
effect of elections.  
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As uncertainty decreases from a high level the payoff of the voter decreases as the selection 
effect becomes weaker. Then there is jump in the payoff whenever the uncertainty is low 
enough for the incumbent to be willing to invest.  For every uncertainty level lower than this 
the incumbent will set the level of investment slightly above the level where the voter is 
indifferent between reelecting the incumbent and the maximum payoff from the challenger. 
When there is very little uncertainty (ψ goes towards infinity) the incumbent knows that the 
voter’s payoff from electing the challenger most likely will be zero.  The incumbent can 
invest ε and still be reelected with probability one because the voter cannot credibly commit 
to not vote for the incumbent when it is in the voters interest to vote for the incumbent.  
 
3.4 The case where the incumbent cares about the voter 
In this section we will assume that the incumbent cares about the realization of the 
investment. This means that the incumbent cares about the payoff the voter gets from the 
investment. However, we find it natural to assume that the incumbent only cares about the 
part of the voter’s payoff that can be attributed to the actions of the incumbent, and not the 
payoff that is resulting from the challenger.  
3.4.1 Without electoral accountability 
If there are no elections and hence no accountability then the maximization problem for the 
incumbent in the first period can be written like this: 
  ܵଵ ൅ ߚሺܵଶ ൅ ߙݎሺܶ െ ܵଵሻሻ 
As above there are no incentives to invest in the second period because the game ends before 
the payoffs eventually will be realized. The solution obviously depends on the parameter 
values. In particular a low ߚ makes the future less important which discourages investment, 
and low values of ߙ and r also makes the investment less valuable to the incumbent.  
                               ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ ׷  ܵଵ ൌ Ͳܫଵ ൌ ܶǡ ܵଶ ൌ ܶܽ݊݀ܫଶ ൌ Ͳ 
                               ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ ׷  ܵଵ ൌ ܶܫଵ ൌ Ͳǡܵଶ ൌ ܶܽ݊݀ܫଶ ൌ Ͳ 
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The intuition behind this threshold is clear. If the future does not mean anything for the 
incumbent (ߚ ൌ Ͳ) there are no incentives to exchange payoff today with meaningless 
payoff in the future.  The more effective the investment (large r), the more the incumbent is 
willing to invest. Similarly the incumbent invests more when he cares more about the voter.  
The expected payoff for the voter in these two cases is given by the following expressions: 
ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳǣܧܷ௩ ൌ ݎܶ 
ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳǣܧܷ௩ ൌ Ͳ 
 
3.4.2 Electoral accountability with a commitment rule 
Again we start by discussing the case where the voter can credibly commit to a reelection 
rule before we move on to the more realistic case of no commitment. Let us (for now) 
assume that the voter reelects the incumbent if and only if the incumbent invests the entire 
budget in the first period. When the parameter values are such that the incumbent would 
have invested in absence of the election ሺߚߙݎ ൒ ͳሻ this reelection rule is non-problematic. 
When ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳthere is a tradeoff for the incumbent. By keeping everything in the first 
period there are no reelection possibilities, but there will be a better payoff in the first period 
which is the most important period. By investing the incumbent gets the return from the 
investment in addition to the opportunity to use the budget for himself in the next period.  
The incumbent chooses to invest when the following inequality holds: 
ߚሺܶ ൅ ߙݎܶሻ ൒ ܶ 
Whenever the incumbent is patient, cares more about the voter and the investment gives a 
good return, it is easier to make him accept the investment agreement. We can see that this 
inequality is significantly easier to satisfy than ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ.  If β is close to 1 then the inequality 
holds except in the case where ߙݎ is very small. But if this expression still does not hold then 
the voter can decide a reelection level of investment lower than T: 
ܶ െ ܫଵ෱ ൅ ߚ ቀܶ ൅ ߙݎ൫ܫଵ෱൯ቁ ൌ ܶ 
ܫଵ෱ ൌ
ߚܶ
ͳ െ ߚߙݎ
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From now on we will focus on cases where the voter cannot make credible commitments. 
 
3.4.3 Electoral accountability without commitment 
We have seen that when the incumbent would prefer no investment the voter can incentivize 
investment through a suitable reelection rule. But this is not a credible reelection rule. The 
incumbent knows that reelection depends on the realization of the random shock, so a 
rational incumbent knows that there will be reelection if the challenger is weak. When the 
incumbent decides about the investment level he correctly anticipates the probability that 
there will be reelection for a given level of investment. The incumbent thus maximizes the 
following payoff function: 
 ܵଵ ൅ ሺ
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ሺݎሺܶ െ ܵଵሻሻሻߚሺܵଶ ൅ ߙݎሺܶ െ ܵଵሻሻ 
ൌ ܵଵ ൅ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶ൰ ሺߚܶ ൅ ߚߙݎܶሻ െ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶ൰ߚߙݎܵଵ െ ሺߚܶ ൅ ߚߙݎܶሻ߰ݎܵଵ ൅ ߰ߚߙݎ
ଶ ሺܵଵሻ
ଶ 
ൌ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶ൰ ሺߚܶ ൅ ߚߙݎܶሻ ൅ ൤ͳ െ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶ൰ߚߙݎ െ ሺߚܶ ൅ ߚߙݎܶሻ߰ݎ൨ ܵଵ ൅ ߰ߚߙݎ
ଶ ሺܵଵሻ
ଶ 
We solve this model for high and low levels of uncertainty. When there is a low level of 
uncertainty the incumbent can guarantee reelection through a sufficient investment, and then 
we must modify this payoff function to account for the fact that the reelection probability 
cannot exceed one. 
 
3.4.3.1 High level of uncertainty 
This function is convex for interior solutions, so we do not find the optimum by taking the 
first order conditions.  Assuming an interior probability solution we find that full investment 
is better than no investment whenever the following inequality holds: 
ܶ ൅
ߚܶ
ʹ
൑ ߚሺ
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶሻሺܶ ൅ ߙݎܶሻ 
This simplifies to: 
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ͳ ൑ ߚݎሺ
ߙ
ʹ
൅ ߰ܶ ൅ ߙ߰ݎܶሻ 
߰ ൒ ߰ ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൦
ͳ
ߚݎ െ
ߙ
ʹ
ܶሺͳ ൅ ߙݎሻ
ǡ Ͳ൪ 
The incumbent invests everything if ψ is greater than this threshold and nothing if it is 
smaller. We can see that if the incumbent is very interested in the investment (ߚߙݎ ൒ ʹሻ 
there will be investment regardless of the uncertainty related to the challenger.   
Proposition 3.4.3.1 If the level of uncertainty is too high the incumbent is not willing to 
invest. 
3.4.3.2 Low level of uncertainty 
If ψ is big enough the incumbent gets reelected without making a full investment. When the 
level of uncertainty is very low the payoff of electing the challenger will very likely be close 
to zero, so it is possible for the incumbent to invest and get reelected with certainty. This 
situation can only occur when the following inequality is satisfied: 
߰ ൒ ෠߰ ൌ
ͳ
ʹݎܶ
 
So when ߰ ൒ ෠߰  the incumbent can secure reelection. In the previous paragraph we found 
that the incumbent was willing to invest whenever ߰ ൒ ߰. Intuitively we would think that 
෠߰ ൒ ߰ , but for some parameter values this inequality does not hold: 
 ෠߰ ൑ ߰ 
ߚߙݎ ൑
ʹ െ ߚ
ʹ
 
When the incumbent cares sufficiently little about the return on the investment, the 
probability corner solution will be reached at lower uncertainty level than߰.  To simplify the 
notation we assume that ߚߙݎ ൒ ଶିఉ
ଶ
. We have already described the situation where ߙ ൌ Ͳ, 
and the situation with a very small ߚߙݎ is not that different from α=0, so this does restriction 
does not substantially change the model. This threshold also has an appealing intuitive 
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feature, because it says that if the incumbent has the opportunity to guarantee reelection 
trough suitable investment, then the incumbent chooses to make the investment.  
 
If the incumbent chooses to invest this means that the incumbent does not have to make a 
full investment to secure reelection. The incumbent can choose to set the level investment 
equal to the above threshold, and this will be better than full investment given that the 
following inequality holds: 
ܶ െ
ͳ
ʹ߰ݎ
൅ ߚ ൭ܶ ൅ ߙݎ ൬
ͳ
ʹ߰ݎ
൰൱ ൒ ߚሺܶ ൅ ߙݎܶሻ 
This will not hold whenߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ . After all, this is a situation where the incumbent wants to 
maximize investment, so even though further investment does not increase the probability of 
electoral gain the incumbent still wants to increase investment. 
 
Using the same logic we know that when ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ the incumbent will not invest more than 
the threshold. Investing to the threshold is better than zero investment if this condition holds: 
ܶ െ
ͳ
ʹ߰ݎ
൅ ߚ ൭ܶ ൅ ߙݎ ൬
ͳ
ʹ߰ݎ
൰൱ ൒ ܶ ൅
ߚܶ
ʹ
 
߰ ൒ ෨߰ ൌ
ͳ െ ߚߙݎ
ݎߚܶ
 
This condition is always satisfied in this setting, due to the above assumptions and 
restrictions, which means that the incumbent always prefers some investment over zero 
investment when the uncertainty level is low.  The intuition is that if ψ is so large that the 
incumbent can get reelected with certainty, an incumbent who only to a small degree cares 
about the voter faces a tradeoff, because only a small investment probably will lead to 
reelection. So when the uncertainty is sufficiently low an incumbent that cares little (or 
nothing) about the investment will still make an investment. But since the goal of investing 
is to secure reelection we can notice that the investment is not larger than necessary to get 
reelected.  
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Proposition 3.4.3.2. If there is a low level of uncertainty the incumbent makes a large 
investment if ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ. Otherwise the incumbent invests just enough to get reelected. 
Below we have summarized the conditions for investment for the different parameter values. 
Uncertainty level Payoff from investment Investment level 
߰ ൒ ෠߰ ʹ െ ߚ
ʹ
൑ ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ ܫଵ ൌ ͳʹ߰ݎ 
߰ ൒ ෠߰ ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ ܫଵ ൌ ܶ 
෠߰ ൒ ߰ ൒ ߰ ʹ െ ߚ
ʹ
൑ ߚߙݎ ൑ ʹ ܫଵ ൌ ܶ 
߰ ൑ ߰ ʹ െ ߚ
ʹ
൑ ߚߙݎ ൑ ʹ ܫଵ ൌ Ͳ 
Table 3.4.3 
 
3.4.4 The effect of uncertainty on the selection and incentives effect 
Generally we can observe that more uncertainty is associated with a lower level of 
investment. This is intuitive as more uncertainty reduces the probability of getting the payoff 
from the investment realized. In accordance with the theoretical literature we have found that 
there are two mechanisms through which elections can be beneficial for the voter. Elections 
give incentives to the politicians to invest in a public good and elections give the voter an 
option to select a more preferred politician. We have shown the effects of these two 
mechanisms given different levels of uncertainty and for different preferences of the 
incumbent. When there is very little uncertainty ሺ߰ ൒ ෠߰ሻ we have seen that the incentives 
effect makes the incumbent invest. In this case the incumbent invests enough to get reelected 
with certainty, so there is no selection effect of elections. But in this case the selection effect 
would have been weak anyway, and that is also the reason that the incumbent is willing to 
invest. For intermediate values of uncertainty ෠߰ ൒ ߰ ൒ ߰ the selection effect is weak 
enough for the incumbent to be willing to invest, but at the same time there is so much 
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uncertainty that the voter sometimes prefers the challenger. In this case the voter gets both a 
selection and incentives effect. The incumbent chooses to invest even in the case where the 
incumbent does not care about the result of the investment. By investing at least to the 
maximum payoff of electing the challenger, the incentives effect is stronger.  For high values 
of uncertainty (߰ ൑ ߰) the investment is a less useful tool to secure reelection. In this case 
the incumbent chooses not to invest even though the incumbent appreciates the investment. 
This implies that elections do not incentivize effort. However, in this case the selection effect 
is strong, which means that the payoff for the voter can be larger even though there is no 
investment. 
 
3.4.5 Can the voter be better off without elections? 
Without elections it is not, by definition, possible to select a more preferred challenger. So 
the selection effect disappears. Without elections it is similarly not possible for elections to 
incentivize investment. However, whenever the incumbent is willing to invest only because 
of the payoff from the investment (ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ), the incumbent has incentives to invest in the 
absence of elections. With elections we have seen above that it is not certain that the 
incumbent invests even though ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ. The incumbent cannot guarantee reelection, so it is 
then the case that the incumbent abstains from investing because the investment might not be 
realized.  We have seen that this happens when ߰ ൑ ߰ and ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ. The incentives effect is 
then stronger in a non-electoral setting, but this still does not imply that the voter necessarily 
is better off without elections. The selection effect is in place with elections, and this effect 
becomes stronger as uncertainty increases. The selection effect of elections dominates the 
incentives effect whenever ߰ is smaller than the following threshold: 
߰ ൑ ߰ ൌ
ͳ
ͺݎܶ
 
This means that there is a non-empty interval where the absence of elections is better than 
elections only if ߰ ൒ ߰, which can be expressed with this inequality: 
ͺ െ ߚ
ͷ
൒ ߚߙݎ 
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We also know that we need ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ in order for elections to hurt the voter. This means that 
we need both of these inequalities to hold for the absence of elections to better for the voter. 
In addition we need that the uncertainty level is so high that the accountable incumbent is 
unwilling to invest. To summarize, no elections is only better for the voter when the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
ͺ െ ߚ
ͷ
൒ ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ 
߰ ൑ ߰ ൑ ߰ 
We can see this does not hold for many parameter values. Assuming β is close to one we 
need αr to be between 1 and 7/5. If β is small αr must be between 1 and 8/5.  So it is only in 
the case where ߰ ൑ ߰ ൑ ߰ and ߚߙݎ ג ሾͳǡ ଼
ହ
ቁ that no elections can be strictly better than 
electoral accountability.   
 
When the level of uncertainty is low enough for the incumbent to invest ሺ ෠߰ ൒ ߰ ൒ ߰ሻ the 
payoff is larger with accountability. We have seen that the voter gets both the selection effect 
and the incentives effect with elections,  and even though the incumbent always invests 
without elections we can never have that no accountability is strictly better, because the 
following inequality always holds: 
ݎܶ ൑ ݉ܽݔሾݎܶǡ ߟሿ 
When the level of uncertainty is sufficiently low the accountable incumbent and the non-
accountable incumbent both choose full investment if they care enough about the result of 
the investmentሺߚߙݎ ൒ ͳሻ.As described in the previous section this is a setting where the 
incentives effect dominates the selection effect, so as long as the incentives effect takes place 
the voter is not hurt by the lack of elections. However, if the incumbent cares less about the 
investment it is still possible that the accountable incumbent is willing to invest, but the non-
accountable incumbent will never invest. 
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Proposition 3.4.5. If ߰ ൒ ߰ ൒ ߰ and ଼ିఉ
ହ
൒ ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ then the voter is better off without 
elections. For all other parameter values electoral accountability is weakly preferred to the 
absence of elections. 
We can summarize these findings with a table: 
Uncertainty level Payoff from investment Comparison of the payoff 
of the voter 
߰ ൑ ߰ ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ ܧܷ௔௖௖ ൒ ܧܷ௡௢௔௖௖ 
߰ ൒ ߰ ൒ ߰ ͺ െ ߚ
ͷ
൒ ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ ܧܷ௔௖௖ ൑ ܧܷ௡௢௔௖௖ 
߰ ൑ ߰ ൑ ෠߰ǡ ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ ܧܷ௔௖௖ ൒ ܧܷ௡௢௔௖௖ 
߰ ൒ ෠߰ ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ ܧܷ௔௖௖ ൌ ܧܷ௡௢௔௖௖ 
 ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ ܧܷ௔௖௖ ൒ ܧܷ௡௢௔௖௖ 
Table 3.4.5. 
 
3.4.6 The commitment problem of the voter and longer terms 
For the parameter values above where no accountability is better for the voter we can 
observe that the voter is facing a commitment problem. Ex-ante she would prefer to agree to 
reelect the incumbent after full investment, and the incumbent would be happy to invest, 
because this is a setting where the incumbent does not need electoral incentives to make the 
investment. But no such binding agreement can be made in a democratic electoral system.  
The incumbent knows that the voter will not reelect him when the challenger is strong, and 
when the incumbent considers this probability in the investment decision there will not be 
investment.  In this case the voter is hurt by her own options. We can observe that this 
situation would not have occurred with longer terms in office. We can think of longer terms 
as consisting of two short terms. If the incumbent knows that he will stay in power when the 
payoff of the investment is realized then the incumbent will invest in the first period.  
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Proposition 3.4.6.If ߰ ൒ ߰ ൒ ߰ and ଼ିఉ
ହ
൒ ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ then longer terms of office are 
beneficial for the voter. 
For other parameter values it is more difficult to draw a conclusion based on this model. 
When we double the term length there will not be an election in the time period of this game 
which means that the selection effect will not take place. However, this is primarily a 
consequence of the way we defined our model. With a longer time period there will of 
course be elections even though the terms in office are longer. The selection effect can 
nevertheless still be weaker in this setting because elections take place less frequently.  Later 
in this paper we will model investment decisions in a multi-period setting. 
 
3.5 Comparison with other models 
In the career concern models more uncertainty (both uncertainty related to competence and 
pure luck) reduces the effort by the incumbent.  Effort is less useful when there is much 
uncertainty because effort then has less impact on reelection possibilities. The same effect is 
present in our model, and makes the incumbent less willing to invest when uncertainty is 
large (߰ ൑ ߰).  However, for low levels of uncertainty we have seen that an increase in 
uncertainty can make the incumbent invests more to still be guaranteed reelection. The 
optimal investment level follows a step function in our model, while it is a continuous 
function in the career concern models. This difference is due to the fact that we assumed that 
the cost function was convex in the career concern models, while the cost of investment in 
our model is the linear function of unrealized personal spending. If we change the cost 
function in the career concern models to a linear function we get that effort is optimal 
whenever the following condition holds:  
ܴ כ ߮ሺͲሻ ൒ ඥߪఏଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ 
This expression also shows that there will be effort only when the uncertainty level is low. 
But in our model there is another effect that dominates when the level of uncertainty is low 
enough (߰ ൒ ෠߰) and ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ. The level of uncertainty is so low that the incumbent knows 
that only a small investment is enough to get reelected, which implies that low levels of 
uncertainty can reduce the incentives. This effect does not take place in the career concern 
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model. One reason for this is that strategic decisions related to comparing different payoffs 
cannot occur when the incumbent does not know his own competence.  
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4. Biased voter 
So far we assumed that the voter reelects the incumbent if and only if the expected payoff of 
reelecting exceeds the payoff of electing the challenger. This means that in the absence of 
investment the voter is in expectation indifferent between the incumbent and the challenger. 
But this is of course a strong assumption. If the incumbent knows that the voter prefers the 
challenger regardless of the investment level, then the incumbent is not willing to invest. 
Caplan (2011) describes the non-rationality of voters in terms of different biases. A bias in 
favor of the challenger or the incumbent can thus be interpreted along these lines. 
Throughout the section we assume that the bias is not so large that the voter prefers either 
the incumbent or the challenger with certainty regardless of the actions of the incumbent. A 
large bias could then mean that the elections lose their importance. We get that the 
incumbent prefers investment to no investment whenever the following inequality holds: 
ܶ ൅ ߚܶሺ
ͳ
ʹ
െ ߰ߪሻ ൑ ߚሺ
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶ െ ߰ߪሻሺܶ ൅ ߙݎܶሻ 
4.1 High level of uncertainty 
 If the level of uncertainty is high enough ߰ ൑ ߰ we already know there will not be 
investment with a non-biased voter. A bias in favor of the challenger clearly does not give 
incentives to investment in this setting, because it makes it even less likely that the 
incumbent will see the return on the investment. An incumbency advantage bias can 
however make the incumbent more willing to invest because this increases the probability of 
realization of payoff.  A marginal bias will generally not increase investment, but if the bias 
is of a certain size then the incumbent can be incentivized to invest.  
Proposition 4.1. For high levels of uncertainty a bias in favor of the incumbent may 
incentivize more investment, while a bias in favor of the incumbent cannot increase the level 
of investment.  
4.2 Intermediate levels of uncertainty 
We can also explain what happens for intermediate levels of uncertainty. As described 
earlier this is a situation where the incumbent is willing to invest even though reelection is 
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not guaranteed.  In this case we have that there will be investment if the following conditions 
holds: 
߰ ൒ ሖ߰ ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൦
ͳ
ߚݎ െ
ߙ
ʹ
ܶሺͳ ൅ ߙݎሻ െ ߙߪ
ǡ Ͳ൪ 
We can see that σ different from zero increases the threshold if σ is positive and decreases 
the threshold if σ is negative. Intuitively it makes sense that increasing the probability of 
realizing the investment will give more incentives to invest. The level of investment if there 
is investment is the same regardless of the bias, but a bias in favor of the incumbent makes 
the incumbent willing to make the investment for a larger value of uncertainty.  
Proposition 4.2. For intermediate level of uncertainty, a small bias in favor of the 
challenger makes the incumbent less willing to invest, while a small incumbency advantage 
makes the incumbent more willing to invest.  
4.3 Low levels of uncertainty 
If the uncertainty is so low that the incumbent can guarantee reelection ෠߰ ൑ ߰, then the 
picture becomes less clear. We still assume that ߚߙݎ ൒ ଶିఉ
ଶ
 which implies that the incumbent 
chooses to guarantee reelection if possible. A bias in favor of the incumbent has no effect on 
the reelection probability if the incumbent chooses to invest, but the bias does increase the 
probability of reelection if the incumbent chooses not to invest. The incumbent will only 
keep the level of investment if the incumbent would have invested in absence of the electoral 
incentives (ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ). In other cases the incumbent reduces the level of investment. This is a 
setting where the incumbent does not care much about the payoff of the investment, but 
chooses to invest because investment is an easy way of getting reelected. This implies that 
every small positive bias leads to a small decrease in the investment level. A small bias in 
favor of the challenger will similarly increase the investment if ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ. The incumbent 
invests just the necessary amount to get reelected. So when the voter is biased in favor of the 
challenger the incumbent chooses to invest more to still be reelected with certainty. But 
when the bias is too large the incumbent chooses to invest nothing. 
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Proposition 4.3. For low levels of uncertainty a bias in favor of the incumbent will reduce 
the level of investment if and only if ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ ǤA small bias in favor of the challenger will 
increase the investment if ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ, but not affect the incumbent if ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳǤ  A larger bias in 
favor of the challenger will reduce the investment.  
 
4.4 Comparison with other models 
In the career concern models discussed earlier any bias will reduce the level of effort. In our 
model there is not a simple relation between bias and investment.  In the career concern 
models the effect from bias is symmetric, meaning that a positive and negative bias has the 
same effect, but in our model this is not necessarily the case. In both models the effect of 
bias and uncertainty is intertwined. When there is very much uncertainty about the 
competence in the career concern model the effect of the bias becomes smaller, 
because߮ ቆ ିೖഊ
ඥఙഇ
మାఙഄమ
ቇ is less different from ߮ሺͲሻ when there is much uncertainty. When the 
random luck increases in the career concern model the performance is a less precise signal of 
quality, such that the bias gets more importance.  In our model the intertwined effect of bias 
and uncertainty is also ambiguous. If ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ a low level of uncertainty is most likely to 
change the investment level, because this is the only situation where marginal a bias with 
certainty will affect the investment level. However, when uncertainty is high incumbency 
advantage can increase investment from zero to full investment.  
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5. Modeling the effect of the term length 
5.1 Set-up 
So far we have assumed that the electoral term is so long that the payoff from the investment 
will be realized if the incumbent is reelected, but not otherwise. This is a strong assumption. 
First of all, the time between the investment and payoff does not need to the same for every 
investment. And even if all processes are of equal length, this length is not necessary the 
same as the term length. 
 
In this part of the paper we try to model the effect of term length by adding more time 
periods to the game. In an infinite-period model the strategy of the incumbent becomes more 
complex. We will therefore focus on stationary strategies where the incumbent takes the 
same action each period. We assume that the investment decision is binary and that the 
uncertainty level is so high that investing does not guarantee reelection. Previously we have 
shown that corner solutions will arise naturally because of convexity of the payoff function, 
so restricting the investment decision to be binary is not changing the core content of the 
model. Initially we also assume that ͳ ൑ ߚߙݎ ൑ ʹ. Formally we can express these 
assumptions like this: 
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶ ൏ ͳ 
ܫ ג ሼͲǡ ܶሽ 
In this section we will only model the incentives effect of election, and refrain from 
analyzing the selection effect and expected payoff for the voter.  
 
5.2 Short terms of office 
The incumbent has the choice of investing or not investing. By not investing the incumbent 
gets a payoff of T in the first period, and is reelected with a probability of ½, because the 
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probability that the payoff from electing the challenger is negative is ½.  In the next period 
there is also a payoff of T and a probability of ½ for staying in office. This leads to the 
following expression for the payoff: 
ܸሺ݊݋݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐሻ ൌ
ܶ
ͳ െ
ߚ
ʹ
 
By investing in every period the payoff in the first periods is given by: 
ଵܸ ൌ ߚሺ
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶሻ ଶܸ 
ଶܸ ൌ ߙݎܶ ൅ ߚሺ
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶሻ ଷܸ 
Using the fact that we only look for stationary equilibriums we can assume that there will be 
investment in every period. The continuation value in the first period is then given by: 
ܸሺ݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐሻ ൌ
ߚሺ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎܶሻ
ͳ െ ߚሺ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎܶሻ
ߙݎܶ 
As earlier the incumbent prefers to invest when the uncertainty is low. When uncertainty 
increases it becomes less likely for the incumbent to see the return on the investment and the 
incentives to invest decrease. The uncertainty threshold is given by the following expression: 
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶ ൒
ͳ
ߚߙݎ െ
ͳ
ʹߚ
ଶߙݎ ൅ ߚ
 
߰ ൒ ߰ଵ ൌ
ʹ െ ߚߙݎ െ ߚ ൅
ͳ
ʹߚ
ଶߙݎ
ʹݎܶሺߚߙݎ െ
ͳ
ʹߚ
ଶߙݎ ൅ ߚሻ
 
So when the level of uncertainty is relatively low (߰ ൒ ߰ଵሻ the incumbent prefers to invest 
every period and getting reelected with a larger probability rather than not investing and 
getting reelected with a probability of ½.  
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5.3 Longer terms of office 
We now try to model the effect of longer terms in office by having an election only after 
every second period. Due to the assumption that ͳ ൑ ߚߙݎ ൑ ʹthere will be investment in the 
periods that are not immediately followed by an election. We can think that each time period 
is lasting twice as long as the previous periods. With that interpretation it will still be a 
stationary strategy for the incumbent to invest every other period. This corresponds to a 
situation where the incumbent wants to invest, but maybe chooses not to invest in periods 
before elections because of the uncertainty related to realizing the payoff.  If the incumbent 
does not invest in the periods before the election the payoff is given by the following 
expression: 
ܸሺ݊݋݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁݈݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊ሻ ൌ
ߚܶሺͳ ൅ ߙݎሻ
ͳ െ
ߚଶ
ʹ
 
By investing in every period the incumbent gets this payoff: 
ଵܸ ൌ ߚߙݎܶ ൅ ߚ
ଶሺ
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶሻ ଷܸ 
ଷܸ ൌ ߙݎܶ ൅ ߚߙݎܶ ൅ ߚ
ଶ
ହܸሺ
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶሻ 
Again using the fact that the incumbent is doing the same in every period we get the 
following payoff by investing: 
ܸሺ݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐሻ ൌ ߚߙݎܶ ൅
ߚଶ ቀ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎܶቁ
ͳ െ ߚଶ ቀ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎܶቁ
ሺߚߙݎܶ ൅ ߙݎܶሻ 
ൌ
ߚߙݎܶ
ͳ െ ߚଶ ቀ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎܶቁ
൤ͳ ൅ ߚ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎܶ൰൨ 
As in the case with election every period the incumbent does not want to invest if there is too 
much uncertainty. The threshold is given by the following expression: 
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߰ ൒ ߰ଶ ൌ
ͳ െ
ͳ
ʹߚ
ଶ െ
ͳ
ʹߚߙݎ ൅
ͳ
Ͷߚ
ଷߙݎ
ߚߙݎଶܶ ൅ ߚଶߙݎଶܶ ൅ ߚଶݎܶ െ
ͳ
ʹߚ
ଷߙݎଶܶ
 
 
5.4 Comparison of different term lengths when ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ  
Both with short and long terms investment occurs when uncertainty is low. Generally we 
cannot say which of these thresholds that is most restrictive, because this depends on the 
values of several different parameter values, but we assumed that ͳ ൑ ߚߙݎ ൑ ʹ. If we also 
impose some natural restrictions on the discount factor, and assume that the discount factor 
is relatively close to 1 (e.g 0.9 or 0.95), then we have the following result: 
Proposition 5.4 Given that ߚߙݎ ൐ ͳ the incumbent chooses to invest if the level of 
uncertainty is sufficiently low. With elections every period the incumbent invests if ߰ ൒ ߰ଵ 
and with elections every second period the incumbent invests if߰ ൒ ߰ଶ. For natural 
parameter values we have that ߰ଵ ൒ ߰ଶ, such that there more often will be investment with 
longer terms.  
 
5.5 Comparison of different term lengths when ߚߙݎ ൑ ͳ 
 So far we have assumed that ߚߙݎ ൐ ͳ, but in this section we will find out how term lengths 
affect the investment decision when this inequality does not hold. This affects the action of 
the incumbent in the period that is not followed by an election, so it will only affect the case 
with election every second period. The incumbent in this case chooses not to invest unless 
the period is followed by an election, and has the choice between never investing and 
investing in every second period. The two values are given by the following expressions: 
ܸሺ݊݋݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐሻ ൌ
ߚܶ ൅ ܶ
ͳ െ
ߚଶ
ʹ
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ܸሺ݅݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐܾ݂݁݋ݎ݁݈݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊ሻ ൌ
ܶሺͳ ൅ ߙݎߚଶ ቀ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎܶቁሻ
ͳ െ ߚଶ ቀ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎܶቁ
 
The incumbent chooses to invest every second period whenever: 
߰ ൒ ߰௟ ൌ
ͳ െ
ͳ
ʹߚߙݎ െ
ͳ
ʹߚ
ଶ ൅
ͳ
Ͷߚ
ଷߙݎ
ݎܶሺߚߙݎ െ
ͳ
ʹߚ
ଷߙݎ ൅ ߚ ൅ ߚଶሻ
 
If β is close to 1 we have that ߰ଵ ൒ ߰௟ . The intuition is that it is easier to incentivize 
investment in the period before the election if the incumbent knows that he can choose his 
favorite action in half of the periods. But on the other hand there will not be investment in 
the periods that are not followed by an election. In this case the effect of term length on 
investment level is ambiguous. For relatively low levels of uncertainty an incumbent can be 
willing to invest every period with short terms, but is only willing to invest prior to elections 
for longer terms. On the other hand, when there is more uncertainty the incumbent is not 
willing to invest with short terms, but can be incentivized to invest half the time with longer 
periods. Intuitively we can think that the incumbent is more willing to what the voter wants 
half the time when the incumbent can get the payoff from choosing the preferred policy the 
rest of the time. 
Proposition 5.5 Given ߚߙݎ ൏ ͳ and election every period the incumbent chooses to invest in 
every period if ߰ ൒ ߰ଵ. With elections after every second period the incumbent invests if 
߰ ൒ ߰௟. For natural parameter values (ߚ close to 1) we have that ߰ଵ ൒ ߰௟ . If ߰ ൒ ߰ଵ there 
will be investment every period with short terms and every other period with longer terms.  
When ߰ଵ ൒ ߰ ൒ ߰௟ there will also be investment in every other period with longer terms, 
but no investment with shorter terms.  
 
5.6 Comparison with other models 
In our model the term length is generally affecting the level of investment. As Dal Bo and 
Rossi (2011) we have found that longer terms can incentivize effort, but we have also found 
that if the level of uncertainty is low enough and the incumbent does not care so much about 
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the payoff from the investment, then there might be less investment with longer terms. In 
contrast to Maskin and Tirole we generally do not find that difference in term length has no 
effect. However, for very high and very low levels of uncertainty our model sometimes 
predicts that the investment level is not affected by the term length.  
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6. Uncertainty related to the return on the investment 
6.1 Set-up of the game 
Up until this section the voter has had an informational advantage over the incumbent. The 
voter has always known the payoff from electing both the incumbent and the challenger. 
With the exception of the settings with commitment to a reelection rule this has implied that 
the voter has chosen the incumbent if and only if the payoff from electing the incumbent has 
exceeded the payoff of electing the challenger. In this part of the paper we will include 
uncertainty from the voter’s point of view about the payoff from the investment. This 
implies that there is dual uncertainty, and to highlight this notion we disregard the case 
where there is very little uncertainty related to the challenger in this section. Neither the 
incumbent nor the voter then knows the exact consequences of their actions.  
 
We assume that the return can be high or low, and it is common knowledge that a certain 
proportion of incumbents are able to provide a high return. The voter observes the level of 
investment, but does not observe the type of the incumbent. We restrict the low-type return 
to be strictly positive, so even though the investment is very non-profitable (close to zero) it 
still provides the voter with a positive payoff. In this part of the paper we also simplify the 
investment to a binary decision, and we also assume that the uncertainty related to the 
challenger is so high that the following inequality holds: 
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎ௜ܶ ൏ ͳ 
ܫ ג ሼͲǡ ܶሽ 
ݎ௜ ג ሼݎ௛ǡ ݎ௟ሽ 
ܲሺݎ ൌ ݎ௛ሻ ൌ ߣ 
ݎҧ ൌ ߣݎ௛ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߣሻݎ௟ 
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Similarly with previous sections we will also assume that the level of return on investment is 
on an intermediate level: 
ʹ െ ߚ
ʹ
൑ ߚߙݎ௜ ൑ ʹ 
6.2 Separating equilibrium 
First we can investigate whether a separating equilibrium exists. This implies a situation 
where the high-type invests and the low type does not invest, and neither of the two types 
have any incentives to do otherwise. The first inequality below describes the conditions 
where the high type invests, and the second inequality describes the conditions where the 
low type does not want to invest given the belief that only high return types invest.  Under 
these conditions there exists a separating equilibrium. 
ߚሺܶ ൅ ߙݎ௛ܶሻ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎ௛ܶ൰ ൒ ܶ ൅
ߚܶ
ʹ
 
ߚሺܶ ൅ ߙݎ௟ܶሻ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎ௛ܶ൰ ൑ ܶ ൅
ߚܶ
ʹ
 
Equivalently we can write it like this: 
ͳ െ
ͳ
ʹߚߙݎ௟
ߚݎ௛ܶሺͳ ൅ ߙݎ௟ሻ
൒ ߰ ൒
ͳ െ
ͳ
ʹߚߙݎ௛
ߚݎ௛ܶሺͳ ൅ ߙݎ௛ሻ
 
If there is too much uncertainty neither of the types wants to invest, and if the uncertainty 
level is sufficiently low both types will invest. But a separating equilibrium exists for 
intermediate values of uncertainty.  
The only difference between the two expressions is given by the difference in return, so 
when this difference is small it is unlikely that there is a separating equilibrium. We can 
observe that the payoff of investing for the low-return type increases in ψ,β,α and r, which 
makes it less likely that the separating equilibrium exists . When ψ and ߚߙݎ௟ are small it 
means that the low-type incumbent cares less about the next period, because the return on the 
investment do not matter that much and is only realized with a relatively small probability. 
The incumbent is thus more willing to do the action that gives the best payoff in the first 
 52 
period. Using the language of Maskin and Tirole (2005) this can be interpreted as weak 
office-holding motive. In this case the high-return type has a stronger office-holding motive 
because this type values the investment more.  
Proposition 6.2 There exists a separating equilibrium where only the high-return type 
incumbent invests for intermediate values of uncertainty. The size of this interval is 
increasing in the difference of office-holding motives between the two candidates.  
 
6.3 Pooling equilibrium 
We now turn our attention to the situation where a separating equilibrium does not exist. 
High values of ψ and ߚߙݎ can be interpreted as strong motive for office-holding, which 
means that the low return incumbent has more incentives to stay in power. Investing 
increases the probability of staying in office, so a strong motive for office-holding makes it 
less likely that there exists a separating equilibrium. When the level of office-motivation is 
high enough for the low-return type then this incumbent will invest and hence a separating 
equilibrium does not exist.  The voter does not know which type of incumbent he is facing, 
and reelects the incumbent when the weighted average of the two returns exceeds the payoff 
from the challenger. This equilibrium exists when the following inequality holds:  
ߚሺܶ ൅ ߙݎ௟ܶሻ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎҧܶ൰ ൒ ܶ ൅
ߚܶ
ʹ
 
The low-return type must be willing to invest knowing that the voter correctly anticipates 
that the low return will invest. When the share of low-return type incumbent is low it is more 
likely that this equilibrium exists, because the voter then believes that the investment most 
likely comes from a high-return incumbent. We can also observe that if the return from the 
low-type incumbent is not very different from the high-return it is more likely that a pooling 
equilibrium exists. 
Proposition 6.3 When the level of uncertainty is low both types are willing to invest. A large 
share of high-return incumbents and a large return for the low-type makes this equilibrium 
more likely to exist.  
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If the level of uncertainty is high enough even the high-return incumbent is unwilling to 
invest, and then there is a pooling equilibrium where both types chooses not to invest. There 
is also a pooling equilibrium where neither of the types invests if this inequality holds: 
ߚሺܶ ൅ ߙݎ௛ܶሻ ൬
ͳ
ʹ
൅ ߰ݎ௟ܶ൰ ൑ ܶ ൅
ߚܶ
ʹ
 
In this equilibrium the voter thinks that the incumbent with certainty is low-return type after 
observing investment. Given this belief neither of the types invests, and then the voter is not 
irrational. However, we rule out this equilibrium by using the “intuitive criterion” by Cho 
and Kreps (1987). We can also note that there is an intermediate level of uncertainty where 
neither a separating nor a pooling equilibrium exists. 
 
6.4 Selection and incentives effect 
6.4.1 Selection and incentives effect in the separating equilibrium 
The incentives effect of elections makes the high-return type invest, but the uncertainty is 
too high for the low-return type to invest. The selection effect in this case consists of two 
elements. The voter chooses to elect the challenger when the payoff from the challenger is 
large, which is the same selection as in the previous sections.  But we can also note that the 
second-term incumbent with greater ex ante probability will be competent than the first 
period incumbent. Of course when the second period is reached the voter knows whether the 
incumbent is the high-return type. 
ܲሺ݄݄݅݃ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊݅݊ܿݑܾ݉݁݊ݐȁݎ݈݁݁݁ܿݐ݁݀ሻ ൌ
ሺ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎ௛ܶሻߣ
ቀ
ͳ
ʹ ൅ ߰ݎ௛ܶቁ ߣ ൅
ͳ െ ߣ
ʹ
 
This happens because the high-return incumbent is reelected with a larger probability. 
However, this second effect has no influence on the payoff of the voter in this setting 
because there is no investment in the second period.  We can observe that the two selection 
effects work in the opposite direction. When ߰ is very low there is a strong selection effect 
related to the challenger, but in this case the probability that the incumbent is the high-return 
type conditional on reelection is smaller.  
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6.4.2 Selection and incentives effect in the pooling equilibrium 
In this equilibrium both types are willing to invest, which means that elections more often 
can incentivize investment.  However, the voter can no longer use the election to elect the 
incumbent when returns are higher than the payoff from the challenger, so there is no 
selection effect related to the type of the incumbent. As earlier there is a selection effect 
related to the payoff of electing the challenger.  
 
Contrary to earlier settings there is now a probability that the voter makes the wrong 
decision because she does not know the type of the incumbent. The probability that the voter 
would have reelected the incumbent if the type was known, but chooses not to reelect is 
given by the following expression:  
ܲሺݎҧܶ ൑ ߟ ൑ ݎ௛ܶሻ ൌ ߰ܶሺݎ௛ െ ݎҧሻ ൌ ߰ܶሺͳ െ ߣሻሺݎ௛ െ ݎ௟ሻ 
Similarly we can find the probability that the voter reelects the incumbent, but would not 
have reelected if the type was known: 
ܲሺݎ௟ܶ ൑ ߟ ൑ ݎҧܶሻ ൌ ߰ܶߣሺݎ௛ െ ݎ௟ሻ 
In these cases the investment incentives of the elections fools the voter into making non-
optimal decisions. 
 
6.5 Expected payoff of the voter  
The expected payoff of the voter in the separating is given by the following expression: 
ܧܷ௩ ൌ ߣ ൬
ݎ௛ܶ
ʹ
൅
ͳ
ʹ
߰ሺݎ௛ܶሻ
ଶ൰ ൅
ͳ
ͺ߰
 
The expected payoff of the voter in the pooling equilibrium is given by this expression: 
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ܧܷ௩ ൌ
ݎҧܶ
ʹ
൅
ͳ
ͺ߰
൅
ͳ
ʹ
߰ሺݎҧܶሻଶ 
It is not intuitively clear whether the pooling equilibrium is better for the voter than the 
separating equilibrium. On one hand the pooling equilibrium gives more investment which is 
valued by the voter, such that the voter prefers both types to invest. This means that the 
incentives effect can be stronger. But on the other hand we have seen that the effect of 
incentives also leads to sometimes making the wrong decision. So the best situation would 
be both types investing and then revealing their type before the election. But the low-type 
would clearly then would not reveal his type because this leads to getting reelected with a 
lower probability.  
 
When the proportion of high-type voters is very low the voter is better off in the pooling 
equilibrium, because a separating equilibrium only rarely will result in investment.  When 
the low-type return is very low the voter clearly is better off in the separating equilibrium, as 
she then is not fooled into reelecting an incumbent with a very low payoff when a better 
challenger is available. But the low-return incumbent is not willing to invest if this payoff is 
low enough, which counterbalances some of this effect.  
 
6.6 Comparison with other models 
In this section we will compare our model with the Maskin and Tirole model. The two 
models are based on slightly different assumptions. In our model the low-return type still 
cares about the voter, and thereby we cannot say that this type has opposite preferences. The 
closest thing to opposite preferences will be when ߙݎ௟ ൌ Ͳ. From earlier in the paper we 
know that this condition only leads to investment if the level of uncertainty is very low, and 
we have assumed the uncertainty is not very low in this section.  
 
In both models the incumbent obviously is more willing to prioritize first period payoff 
when ߚ is small, as this describes a setting where the future is down weighted compared to 
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the present.  In our model the low type incumbent cares about the voter’s payoff from the 
investment, which limits the low-type’s incentives to invest.  When ݎ௟ is low enough the low-
type never invests. So intuitively, the low-type is more willing to fool the voter when the 
voter has relatively little to lose by being fooled.  In the Maskin and Tirole model the non-
congruent incumbent has opposite preferences as the voter, and considerations like this are 
not relevant. So in our separating equilibrium the incumbent chooses not to invest because 
the payoff from the investment weighted with the probability of reelection is not large 
enough. 
 
Our pooling equilibrium has similarities with the pandering equilibrium in the Maskin and 
Tirole model. There is no selection effect in the pandering equilibrium of Maskin and Tirole. 
Both types choose according to the prior of the voter, so the voter cannot use the first period 
action to get useful information about the competence. In our model the same logic applies 
for the types of the incumbent, but there still exists a selection effect because the voter can 
choose the challenger. This can be seen as a more reasonable interpretation of the electoral 
process. Even though electoral incentives are so large that the incumbent does anything to 
get reelected, there should be a possibility that the voter prefers the challenger. In the Maskin 
and Tirole model the incumbent is always reelected in the pooling equilibrium even though 
the voter in fact is indifferent between reelecting the incumbent and electing the challenger. 
In our model neither the high-type nor the low return-type knows if there will be reelection 
after investment. The random payoff from electing the challenger might exceed the payoff 
from the investment, and in this case the payoff from the investment is not realized. It is 
more reasonable to assume that there is not one action that guarantees reelection. We do not 
have to rely on indifference conditions in our model as the payoff from electing the 
challenger is a continuous random variable.  According to the Fearon critique (1999) the 
equilibrium based on indifference conditions can be considered more fragile.  
 
 
 57 
7. Empirical literature 
 
7.1 Electoral incentives 
A prediction from our model, as well as most other political agency models, is that 
incumbents in their last term are less willing to act in the interests of the voter. In our model 
and in the career concern models this happens because effort/investment is costly and does 
not give any payoff in the last period. In the Besley model and the Maskin and Tirole model 
the congruent incumbent still acts in the interests of the voters in the last period, but the non-
congruent incumbent chooses the opposite action.  
 
In an influential study of electoral incentives, Ferraz and Finan (2011) investigate the 
relationship between electoral incentives and corruption in local governments in Brazil. They 
find that first-term mayors, who are subject to reelection incentives, misappropriate 27 % 
fewer resources than mayors without such incentives. But there might be unobservable 
characteristics that are correlated with both corruption and reelection. It can be the case that 
politicians that are more cynical and more intelligent are more corrupt and get reelected with 
a larger probability. They use Regression Discontinuity Design to compare situations where 
incumbents barely won with narrow losses. At the threshold (winning margin of zero) there 
is no difference between the winners and losers if the potential outcomes are continuous and 
this than be seen as a quasi-experiment (Lee, 2008). Using this specification they still find 
that second term mayors are more corrupt. They also compare second-term mayors with 
first-term mayors that get reelected later, and find that their results still hold.  
 
The findings are consistent with the established political agency models. These results can be 
interpreted as evidence of the positive effect of electoral accountability. But these results are 
consistent with different models, including models where accountability plays no part. In our 
model without accountability there is also more corruption in the second period than the first 
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period (as long as ߚߙݎ ൒ ͳ), because the second-term incumbent knows that there is no 
point in engaging in long-term policies that cannot be finished.   
 
7.2 Disentangling the effects from incentives and selection 
In our model, as well as in other agency models there is an effect of incentives and a 
selection effect. The Ferraz and Finan paper (2011) shows that electoral incentives can affect 
incumbents. However, there might still be a hidden selection effect. Hypothetical first term 
mayors without reelection incentives can be even more corrupt than second term mayors. 
Alt, Bueno de Mesquita and Rose (2011) exploit exogenous variation in term limits of U.S. 
governors to disentangle the two effects. Some U.S governors cannot get reelected, while 
others can be reelected once. By comparing first term ineligible governors with first term 
eligible governors they isolate the incentives effect, and by comparing first term ineligible 
governors with second term ineligible governors they isolate the selection effect. They find a 
strong positive effect of both incentives and selection on economic outcomes, and the two 
effects are roughly equally large (Alt et al, 2011). This paper must assume that the pool of 
potential politicians is not dependent on the term limit. It is not unthinkable that a different 
set of candidates enter politics in states with reelection possibilities. Gagliarducci and 
Nannicini (2013) find that the selection effect strongly dominates. Galasso and Nannicini 
(2011) use a clever trick to isolate the effect of incentives from the effect of selection. They 
find that more competent politicians perform better in Italian local governments. However, 
more competent politicians are allocated to contested districts, so the better performance can 
also be caused by more electoral incentives. Galasso and Nannicini (2011) then investigate 
what happens when parties decide to change electoral alliances on the national level. These 
decisions will generally not be influenced by local level politics, but the influence of 
changing alliances filters down to the local level. Districts that were contestable before the 
election could then become safe districts. They find that the effect of having competent 
politicians on performance still dominated the effect of electoral incentives (Galasso & 
Nannicini, 2011).  
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7.3 The effect of the term length 
There is a significant variation in term length across the world, which makes cross-country 
comparisons possible.  However, this strategy might be unwise because the length of term is 
endogenous. We can imagine that the term length connected to other institutional and 
cultural features, and term length is not randomly assigned. Hypothetically one could think 
that poorer states choose to have longer terms in office because elections are costly to 
arrange, and in this case cross-country comparisons might provide us with spurious causal 
effects.  However, in rare cases there are random assignments of term length. Dal Bo and 
Rossi (2008) study the case of Argentina after the democratization in 1983. The Argentinian 
Constitution requires renewal of half the House every two years. Normally this is solved by 
electing half of the seats every second year, but this could not be done in this case as there 
was no democracy prior to 1983. This led to the decision that half the legislatives in 1983 
were randomly picked out to serve for two years and the other half for four years. We can 
exploit this exogenous variation to find the effect of term length, but we must note that this 
natural experiment is related to legislators rather than incumbents. Dal Bo and Rossi (2008) 
find that legislators that were selected for four years have a significantly better performance 
in the legislature. The natural experiment is useful for causal analysis, but it is more difficult 
to generalize the findings. Something extraordinary about Argentina in the 1980’s can make 
the results less relevant for other countries at other times. In 2001 Argentina engaged in a 
similar natural experiment due to modification of term lengths in the Argentinian Senate. 
This time legislators were randomly assigned to serve for two, four or six years, and again 
they find that longer-serving legislators perform better (Dal Bo and Rossi, 2008).   
 
7.4 Uncertainty and investment 
In our model we assumed that electoral decisions can be seen as an investment where the 
effect of the effort lies in the future. The findings of Dal Bo and Rossi (2008) also present 
this view. They explain the difference in performance with longer term legislators being 
more willing to invest in long-term policies. We can observe that this finding supports our 
model, which states that longer term incumbents will invest more (at least as long as ߚߙݎ ൒
ͳ).  There can be other reasons than the “investment logic” to explain the difference in 
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performance, but to test whether the investment effect is reasonable we can observe the 
reelection probabilities. They find that short-term legislators that have a greater probability 
of getting reelected act more like long-term legislators. This is consistent with our model. 
When the probability of getting reelected ሺଵ
ଶ
൅ ߰ݎܫሻ  is close to 1 the maximization problem 
of a short period incumbent becomes similar to the maximization problem of the long period 
incumbents. On the other hand, when the probability of getting reelected is very low in our 
model, there will only be investment with longer terms. This is exactly what Dal Bo and 
Rossi find in the Argentinian House.  
 
7.5 Political Myopia 
Aidt and Dutta (2011) find that democracies-which are subject to electoral incentives- spend 
more on transfers and less on public good than autocracies, which may be a result of political 
myopia. Perotti (1996) also point to an empirical negative correlation between frequent 
changes in the political system and economic growth. 
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8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have developed an alternative political agency model. We have regarded 
political effort as an investment that is only realized when the incumbent is reelected. We 
have also added uncertainty related to the payoff of electing the challenger. These two 
features are in general enough to avoid that the voter is indifferent between reelecting the 
incumbent and electing the challenger. By making the incumbent choose the level of 
investment before the quality of the challenger is revealed we are allowing the voter to have 
an informational advantage. We have then shown how the conditions for investment vary 
with uncertainty. More uncertainty implies less incentives to invest as long as the politician 
cares about the payoff from the investment. However, when the level of uncertainty is low 
an increase in uncertainty can incentivize more investment when the incumbent does not so 
much about the payoff from the investment. Then we proceed to find that biases have an 
ambiguous effect on electoral incentives. If the level of uncertainty is high enough the 
incumbent needs a positive bias to be willing to invest, but when the uncertainty level is low 
a positive bias can decrease the level of investment. A longer term of office can incentivize 
investment when the conditions are such that there will not be investment with shorter terms.  
 
In the end we must again stress the limitations of this model and other political agency 
models. By limiting the function of elections to incentivizing effort and selection of more 
competent politicians we have seen that we are not capturing important aspects of voting.  
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